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Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Florida Supreme
Court has yet ruled whether a defendant’s refusal to take the
Blood Alcohof Test1 is admissible evidence.
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Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Florida Su-
preme Court has yet ruled whether a defendant's refusal to take the
Blood Alcohof Test1 is admissible evidence. The legal issues involved
came into focus in Schmerber v. California,2 where the the Supreme
Court ruled that a defendant did not have a fourth or fifth amendment
right to resist the withdrawal of blood which would be tested to mea-
sure the alcoholic content of his bloodstream. Justice Brennan, speak-
ing for the majority, ruled that the results of the blood alcohol test
were not testimonial in nature and did not infringe on the defendant's
fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself.3 However, the Court
left unanswered the question of whether admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to the blood alcohol test would violate his
fifth amendment rights.
After Schmerber, Florida's legislature passed an Implied Consent
Statute. The statute stated that any person accepting the privilege of
driving in Florida consented in advance to permit a blood test if he
were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol [DUI].5 If the
alcohol level equalled or exceeded 0.10% by weight of his blood, the
defendant was presumed to be under the influence of alcohol.8 If a de-
* County Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida; J.D. Boston University, 1973;
B.S. University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Finance, 1970.
1. The term "test", unless otherwise stated, means any and all tests given to the
defendant to determine the level of alcohol in his blood stream.
2. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
3. Id. at 763, citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
4. FLA. STAT. § 322.261 (1969).
5. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(a) (1979).
6. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(2)(c) (1979).
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fendant refused to take the test, his license was suspended for six
months.7
In order to determine whether a defendant's refusal to take the
test is admissible, four issues must be examined. The analysis will focus
on the courts' choice of words in expressing their holdings.
First, does introduction of a defendant's refusal violate his fifth
amendment right concerning self incrimination? Since the defendant is
required to take the test, his refusal may be testimonial in nature,
thereby compelling him to testify against himself.8 Introduction of his
refusal might be impermissible comment by the prosecutor on the right
of the defendant to remain silent.9
Second, does a defendant have the statutory right not to take the
test?10 If a defendant does have such a right, it would be unfair and a
denial of fundamental due process to penalize his exercise of that right
by admitting his refusal."' Since the Florida Statute requires informing
a defendant his license will be suspended for three months, but does not
specify his refusal would be admissible, the legislature may have in-
tended to prohibit the refusal from being admitted into evidence.
Third, would the probative value of such a refusal be outweighed
by its prejudicial effects?1 2
Fourth, regardless of a defendant's statutory or constitutional
rights, are there instances where admitting a defendant's refusal would
be fundamentally unfair?'3
7. FLA. STAT. § 322.261 (1969) (amended 1970). The amendmenf lowered the
suspension period to three months. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(a) (1979).
8. See text accompanying notes 16-27 infra at 210-15.
9. See text accompanying notes 28-41 infra at 216-18.
10. See text accompanying notes 44, 50-77 infra at 219-29.
11. See text accompanying notes 45-49 and note 78 infra at 220-21. See Gay v.
Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967); but see State v. Duke, 378 So.
2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Neither case fully explains the legal consequences
of admitting or not admitting such evidence. The conflict was resolved in Miller v.
State, 403 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1981) discussed in text accompanying notes 99-102 infra
at 236-37.
12. See text accompanying notes 79-94 infra at 230-34.
13. See text accompanying notes 95-110 infra at 235-38.
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In Schmerber, the defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test;
the refusal was admitted into evidence by the trial court. Because the
defendant failed to object to the admission of his refusal at trial, the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the refusal was admissible.
The Supreme Court nevertheless discussed the issue in a footnote:
This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State
tried to show that the accused had incriminated himself when told
that he would have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence may
be an unavoidable by-product of the compulsion to take the test,
especially for an individual who fears the extraction or opposes it
on religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to submit to
such attempts to discover evidence, the State may have to forgo the
advantage of any testimonial products of administering the test -
products which would fall within the privilege. Indeed, there may
be circumstances in which the pain, danger, or severity of an oper-
ation would almost inevitably cause a person to prefer confession to
undergoing the 'search,' and nothing we say today should be taken
as establishing the permissibility of compulsion in that case. But no
such situation is presented in this case.
Petitioner has raised a similar issue in this case, in connection with
a police request that he submit to a 'breathalyzer' test of air ex-
pelled from his lungs for alcohol content. He refused the request,
and evidence of his refusal was admitted in evidence without objec-
tion. He argues that the introduction of this evidence and a com-
ment by the prosecutor in closing argument upon his refusal is
ground for reversal under Griffin v. California. We think general
Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the particular holding of
Griffin, would be applicable in these circumstances, see Miranda v.
Arizona. Since trial here was conducted after our decision in Mal-
loy v. Hogan,. . . making those principles applicable to the States,
we think petitioner's contention is foreclosed by his failure to object
on this ground to the prosecutor's question and statements. 14
14. 384 U.S. at 765 n.9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
2111Refusing Blood Alcohol Test
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Decisions in Foreign Jurisdictions
First, since the defendant is required to take the test, his refusal
may be "testimonial" in nature thereby compelling him to testify
against himself.
The majority of cases hold that a defendant's refusal to take the
test is not testimonial in nature.1 5 Since the fifth amendment right not
to incriminate oneself protects testimony but not conduct, such deci-
sions permit a court to admit the defendant's refusal. In deciding this
delicate issue, it is necessary to determine what the United States Su-
preme Court meant in footnote nine in Schmerber.
Newhouse v. Misterly offered an explanation of the Schmerber
footnote:
'If it wishes to compel persons to submit to such attempts to dis-
cover evidence, the State may have to forgo the advantage of any
testimonial products of administering the test - products which
would fall within the privilege.' In context the Court seems here to
be talking of an incriminating statement by the accused which is
induced by the requirement that the test be taken. See United
States v. Wade.
The second portion of footnote 9 muddies up the waters some-
what. It discusses a 'similar issue,' i.e., the consequences of refusing
to take the test.
Read together to us the two portions of the Schmerber foot-
note indicate that a refusal to take a blood test is not a testimonial
'statement' within the Fifth Amendment; rather, it is best de-
scribed as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt. See People v.
Ellis. Nonetheless, the reference to the Miranda footnote can be
read to imply that where an underlying right to refuse such a blood
15. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967);
Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Rutan, 229 Pa. Super. 400, 323 A.2d 730 (1974); Welch v. District Ct. of Vermont,
594 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412
N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978) appeal dismissed sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891
(1979); Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969); Davis v. State, 367
N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 299 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1978); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); City of Wauke-
sha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401, 164 N.W.2d 314 (1969); State v. Holt, 261 Iowa
1069, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968).
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test is present, it would be improper to draw adverse inferences
from failure of the accused to respond to a request for a blood test
because the accused would thereby be penalized for exercising his
rights to refuse the test.16
A similar view was expressed by Chief Justice Traynor of the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in People v. Ellis.1 7 That decision held admissi-
ble a defendant's refusal to submit to voice exemplars. 18 Justice Tray-
nor explained why footnote nine of Schmerber never intended to
suppress a defendant's refusal to do a legally required act.
We are aware that the United States Supreme Court in
Schmerber v. State of California has cautioned that in some cases
the administration of tests might result in 'testimonial products'
proscribed by the privilege. We do not believe, however, that the
inferences flowing from guilty conduct are such testimonial prod-
ucts. Rather, the court's concern seemed directed to insuring full
protection of the testimonial privilege from even unintended coer-
cive pressures. In the case of a blood test, for example, the court
considered the possibility that fear induced by the prospect of hav-
ing the test administered might itself provide a coercive device to
elicit incriminating statements. Such a compelled testimonial prod-
uct would of course be inadmissible.19
Justice Traynor explained that unlike confessions, which might be
coerced, no useful purpose would be served in excluding a defendant's
refusal to take a voice identification test.
A suspect asked to speak for voice identification is not sub-
jected to the same psychological pressures said to be generated by
a demand for testimony. It is no more unfair to ask a suspect to
speak for voice identification than to ask him to appear in a lineup
for visual identification. The psychological pressures are reduced to
the same degree, through a limitation of alternatives. Deceit is im-
probable; the simple choice for a guilty person is between conduct
16. 415 F.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
17. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
18. The Court in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), held that voice
examplars were admissible.
19. 65 Cal. 2d at 538, 421 P.2d at 398, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (citations omitted).
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likely to expose incriminating evidence and inferences as to guilt
likely to flow from a successful refusal to participate.
A voice test, however, contemplates no such intrusion into privacy;
no disclosure of thought or privately held information is requested.
One's voice is hardly of a private nature. It is constantly exposed to
public observation and is merely another identifying physical
characteristic.
It thus appears that an extension of the privilege to voice iden-
tification would serve none of the purposes of the privilege. It
would only exclude evidence of considerable importance when vis-
ual identification is doubtful or impossible. . . denial of access to a
pertinent identifying trait can only weaken a system dedicated to
the ascertainment of truth.20
A small minority of cases have held that a defendant's refusal to
take the alcohol test is testimonial in nature;21 thus to permit his re-
fusal into evidence would violate his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. These courts have also ruled that since the defendant is
required to take the test, his decision to take or not to take the test is
"compelled" by the state.
In Clinard v. State the Texas appellate court reasoned:
A defendant's silence or negative reply to a demand or request by
an officer made upon him while under the necessary compulsion
attendant with custodial arrest, which demand or question reasona-
bly called for an immediate reply by the defendant is clearly a tacit
or overt expression and communication of the defendant's thoughts
in regard thereto. Doyle v. Ohio. The obvious purpose and certain
result of proving a person accused of intoxication refused a request
to take a blood test is to show the jury that the accused, with his
full knowledge of the true amount he had consumed, thought that
20. Id. at 535, 421 P.2d at 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
21. State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973); Clinard v. State,
548 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Wilson, 613 P.2d 384 (Kan. 1980);
People v. Rodriguez, 80 Misc. 2d 1060, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1975).
Rodriguez seems to be overruled by People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d
584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 appeal dismissed sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891
(1979). See also Note, Constitutional Limits on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78
YALE L.J. 1074 (1969).
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he could not afford to take said test. Such was the only reason for
its relevancy. Thus said evidence is without doubt of communica-
tive and testimonial character and not mere factual proof of a then
existing physical characteristic .... 2
But that does not appear to be a fair reading of what Justice Bren-
nan had in mind when he wrote footnote nine in Schmerber. This au-
thor is persuaded by the reasoning of Newhouse s and Ellis24 that what
Brennan intended was to forbid actual statements made by the defen-
dant out of fear of taking the test. For example, if the defendant stated
he did not want blood withdrawn because he had consumed ten beers,
the statement concerning how much beer he had consumed would not
be admissible.
Even if defendant's refusal were considered "testimonial" in na-
ture, there remains the question of whether the defendant is really
compelled to refuse the test. Numerous courts have compared refusal
to take the test with a defendant's attempted escape.25 Both have been
held admissible as indicating a course of conduct by the defendant.
However, one court distinguished a defendant's escape which was ad-
missible from a defendant's refusal to take a test.
[T]he distinction lies in the fact that the escape and flight are not
compelled or even requested; whereas, if an accused under custo-
dial arrest is requested or offered a chemical test for intoxication,
anything he does other than affirmatively agree to same is a refusal
to submit. Thus escape and flight are not 'compelled', a necessary
factor under the fifth amendment, but a refusal to take a chemical
test by silence or negative reply to a State's request or offer is
compelled. 28
Is it truly fair to say that a defendant is compelled not to take the test?
People v. Thomas explained why there is no such compulsion:
In no way in such a circumstance is there any compulsion on the
22. 548 S.W.2d at 718 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
23. 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969).
24. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
25. See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra.
26. 548 S.W.2d at 718-19.
2151
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defendant to refuse to take the test - the conduct which is the sub-
ject of the challenged evidence; on the contrary the compulsion is
to take the test. Submission to the test, not its evasion, was what
was desired by the police officers in this case.2
Second, does admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to
take the test constitute impermissible comment on a defendant's right
to remain silent?
In Griffin v. California,28 the Supreme Court ruled that a prosecu-
tor could not comment on a defendant's refusal to testify at time of
trial. The Court recently ruled that this principle is so important that if
the defendant requests, a judge must inform the jury that a defendant's
refusal to testify can not be considered by the jury as inferring his
guilt.219
One court has ruled directly that admission of a defendant's re-
fusal to take the test constitutes impermissible comment on his right to
remain silent.8 0 As authority for this position, Johnson v. State cited
the Florida case of Gay v. Orlando.1 However, the Georgia court mis-
understood Gay, which specifically held comment on a defendant's re-
fusal to testify was not comment on his right to remain silent. Judge
Eberhardt's dissent (in a 4-3 decision) 'strongly criticized the majority:
The refusal to take the test is not to be equated with the fail-
ure of the accused to take the stand and make an unsworn state-
ment or testify in his own behalf. We agree readily that is it im-
proper for the court or the state's counsel to make reference to
that. But that is not a circumstance connected with the arrest - it is
something which happens in the course of the trial itself.8 2
The majority of cases have held that admission of a defendant's
refusal does not constitute impermissible comment on a defendant's
27. 46 N.Y.2d at 108, 385 N.E.2d at 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (emphasis in
original).
28. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
29. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
30. 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972). But see also People v. Hayes, 64
Mich. App. 203, 235 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1975), discussed at note 49 infra.
31. 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
32. 125 Ga. App. at 617, 188 S.E.2d at 422.
1216 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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right to remain silent.33 In explaining why admitting a defendant's re-
fusal would not be an impermissible comment on the right of a defen-
dant to remain silent, the Supreme Court.of California stated in People
v. Sudduth:
The sole rationale for the rule against comment on a failure to tes-
tify is that such a rule is a necessary protection for the exercise of
the underlying privilege of remaining silent . . . A wrongful re-
fusal to cooperate with law enforcement officers does not qualify
for such protection. A refusal that might operate to suppress evi-
dence of intoxication, which disappears rapidly with the passage of
time . . ., should not be encouraged as a device to escape
prosecution.'"
Decisions by Florida Courts
First, no Florida appellate court has ruled that comment by a
prosecutor on a defendant's refusal to do a lawfully required act consti-
tutes impermissible comment on the defendant's right to remain silent.
Second, with one exception, the Florida appellate courts have
ruled that a defendant's refusal to do a lawfully required act is not
testimonial in nature; therefore, a defendant's refusal is admissible.3 5 In
following the majority trend, the Florida Supreme Court explained why
33. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967)
cert. denied 389 U.S. 850 (1967), reh. denied 389 U.S. 996 (1967); Hill v. State, 366
So. 2d 296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) affd 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979); People v.
Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978) appeal dismissed
sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 (1979); Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d
514 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); City of
Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 119, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); Davis v. State,
367 N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); City of Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401,
164 N.W.2d 314 (1969); State v. Holt, 261 Iowa 1069, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968); State
v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968).
34. 65 Cal.2d at 546, 421 P.2d at 403, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
35. State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (defendant's
refusal to submit to a nitrate test to determine gunpowder residue held admissible);
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1980); Lusk v. State, 367 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Joseph v. State, 316 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (defen-
dant's refusal to give voice exemplar admissible); Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla.
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such refusal is not testimonial in nature:
[Defendant's] privilege against self-incrimination would not have
been violated by compelling him to speak the words spoken by the
extortionist, and therefore his refusal to speak was not an exercise
of this right. Since the fifth amendment offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to a voice exemplar and since it does not
privilege refusal to submit, the admission of [defendant's] refusal
into evidence was not error.36
The only Florida appellate court to state that a defendant's refusal
was "testimonial" in nature was Gay v. Orlando,7 decided prior to the
passage of Florida's Implied Consent Law. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal stated: "In the case before us petitioner was confronted with
a choice of either voluntarily submitting to the test or refusing and
thereby making a self-incriminating statement. While the results of a
properly admitted breathalyzer test are not -within the privilege, self-
incriminating testimonial by-products are.""8
The Gay rationale was strongly criticized by the Second District
Court of Appeal in State v. Esperti.3 9 In admitting evidence of defen-
dant's obstruction of police attempts to administer a test measuring
gun powder burns, the court stated that "his actions were a direct by-
product, not of the administration of the test, but of the wrongful re-
fusal to submit thereto; and wrongful conduct poisons its own fruit. ' 0
Esperti pointed out that Gay's statment that defendant's refusal was
testimonial was pure dicta. The Second District declined to be bound
by such dicta.4 '
Thus Florida courts other than Gay have uniformly ruled that a
defendant's refusal to do a lawfully required act is admissible evidence.
Comment on a defendant's refusal does not constitute comment on a
36. 379 So. 2d at 102.
37. 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
38. Id. at 898.
39. 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
40. Id. at 419.
41. Id. The dicta in Gay was also criticized in Becker, Admissibility of Testimo-
nial By-Products of a Physical Test, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 50 (1969). Becker
prophecized that future Florida courts would follow Esperti rather than Gay. His pre-
diction proved correct.
218 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss2/2
defendant's right to remain silent. Nor is the defendant's refusal to do
a lawfully required act "testimonial" in nature. Florida is in accord
with the majority of states throughout the country which have decided
this issue; the majority position is the better reasoned one. In Florida
the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause should not constitute a
barrier to admission of a defendant's refusal to take the test.
Statutory Right Not to Take the Test
Decisions From Foreign Jurisdictions
In order to fully understand whether in Florida a defendant has
the statutory "right" to refuse the test, it is necessary to compare Flor-
ida's Implied Consent Law with those of other states. Some states stat-
utorily permit a defendant's refusal to be admissible evidence, 42 other
states statutorily prohibit such refusal to be admissible evidence. 43 Un-
fortunately, Florida Statute Section 322.261 fails to specifically indi-
cate whether a defendant's refusal to take the test would be admissible.
First, does the state statute give the defendant the "right" to re-
fuse the alcohol test? A large number of state statutes, while not spe-
cifically stating whether a defendant's refusal is or is not admissible, do
state that a defendant has the right not to take the test.44 In states with
42. a) Alabama: ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(a) (1975); Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318
(Ala. 1979). b) Arizona: ARz. REv. STAT. § 28-692-H (1981); Campbell v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971). c) Delaware: 21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §
2749 (1979); State v. Lynch, 274 A.2d 443 (Del. Sup. Ct. of New Castle 1971); War-
ren v. State, 385 A.2d 137 (Del. 1978). d) Iowa: IowA CODE § 321B.11 (1975); State
v. Tierman, 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). e) North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
139.1(f) (1978); State v. Flannery, 31 N.C. App. 617, 230 S.E.2d 603 (1976). f) Ver-
mont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (1981); State v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d
1115 (1978).
43. a) Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 11-501(h) (Smith-Hurd 1981); Peo-
ple v. Boyd, 17 Ill. App. 3d 879, 309 N.E.2d 29 (1974). b) Maine: ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1312(8) (Supp. 1981); State v. Gillis, 199 A.2d 192 (Me. 1964). c)
Maryland: MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a) (1980). Davis v. State, 8
Md. App. 327, 259 A.2d 567 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (construing the prior statute, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 100(c) (1954) (repealed 1969). d) Massachusetts: MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (1969 & Supp. 1981); Commonwealth v. Scott, 269
N.E.2d 454 (Mass. 1971).
44. a) State v. Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 345, 241 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1976) quoting
219 1Refusing Blood Alcohol Test16:1982
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such statutes, courts held that a defendant's refusal is not admissible.
They did so on fundamental fifth amendment due process grounds.
These courts reasoned that since a defendant has a statutory right to
refuse the test, it would be grossly unjust to penalize a defendant, other
than by statutorily suspending his license, for exercising that right. In
State v. Oswald,5 the South Dakota Supreme Court explained:
In the case before us the Defendant was informed of his statutorily
guaranteed right and, for whatever reason we do not know, he
elected not to submit to the test. Certainly it is unfair to create by
statute a right not to submit to a chemical test and to allow the
accused to exercise that right and then in open court before a jury
to permit testimony concerning that refusal which can all too easily
work in the minds of the jury members to the prejudice of the
defendant. 46
The court went on to adopt the position of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Duckworth v. State:4"
'[T]he defendant's refusal to take the test was used by the state in
its case in chief for purely prejudicial purposes. The accused's re-
fusal should have ended the inquiry on the subject. It ill behooves
the courts to say you have a right to refuse to do something, which
may prove either beneficial or detrimental to you, and yet, notwith-
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976): "such person shall be requested by said
officer to submit to such analysis and shall be advised by said officer of his right to
refuse to submit to such analysis." (emphasis added). b) People v. Hayes, 164 Mich.
App. 203, 235 N.W.2d 182 (1975); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(a) (1967);
Collins v. Secretary of State, 384 Mich. 656, 663, 187 N.E.2d 423, 426 (1971) quoting
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(d) (1967): "A person under arrest shall be ad-
vised of his right to refuse to submit to chemical tests; and if he refuses the request of a
law enforcement officer to submit to chemical test no test shall be given." (emphasis
added). c) State v. Stuart, 157 A.2d 294 (D.C. 1960). See also Washington v. Parker,
16 Wash. App. 632, 633, 558 P.2d 1361, 1362 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61-505
(repealed 1968): "Evidence of the chemical analysis or scientific breath test of any kind
of such person's blood shall not be admissible unless such person shall have been ad-
vised by the person given the test. . . that such person has a constitutional right not to
submit to such test." (emphasis added).
45. 90 S.D. 342, 241 N.W.2d 566 (1976).
46. Id. at 346, 241 N.W.2d at 569.
47. 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1957).
1220 Nova Law Journal
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standing your right to do so, we will permit your refusal to be
shown and enable the state to destroy your right and achieve indi-
rectly by innuendo what it was prevented by law from accomplish-
ing directly. We can conceive of no greater inconsistency."48
An appellate Michigan court took a similar view in People v.
Hayes:
Under § 625a, an individual arrested for drunk driving has a
choice. He can either submit to a test the results of which could
create a virtually irrefutable presumption of guilt against him, or
he can refuse the test and suffer the revocation. If the fact that a
defendant has chosen not to submit to a test can be placed before
the jury as an inference of his guilt, then he will be put in the
position of having to risk providing evidence for the prosecution by
submitting to the test or of certainly providing it by refusing to
submit. It would be fundamentally unfair to put a defendant in
such a 'damned if he does, damned if he doesn't' position. The Leg-
islature provided a definite choice, and we cannot render a decision
which would make that choice an illusory one."
Where a defendant is told he has a right to refuse the test, it would be
unfair to punish the defendant for exercising that statutory right,
Therefore, I believe these cases are correctly decided.
However, in states where a defendant is not specifically given a
statutory or constitutional "right" to refuse, the refusal may be admis-
sible. The majority of states whose statutes do not confer on the defen-
dant the right to refuse the test have permitted such refusal to be ad-
mitted into evidence.50 These courts reasoned that it is a misnomer to
48. 90 S.D. at 347, 241 N.W.2d at 569.
49. 164 Mich. App. at 208, 235 N.W.2d at 185. Although Michigan gave the
defendant the statutory right to refuse the test (see note 44(d) supra), the Hayes court
never relied on that statute. In fact, the court found that whether a particular state
statute gave the defendant a "right" to refuse the test was essentially irrelevant. Id.
50. People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845
(1978) appeal dismissed sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 (1979); New-
house v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Tabisz, 129 N.J. Super. 80,
322 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 298
N.W.2d 196 (1980); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); People v.
Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967); State v. Miller, 257
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state a defendant has a "right" to refuse the test. The best explanation
of how the term "right" has been misused was discussed by Justice
Jasen in his concurring opinion of People v. Paddock:
[The] 'right' of refusal is not really a right in the sense of a funda-
mental personal privilege, but rather was merely an accommoda-
tion to avoid a distasteful struggle to forcibly take blood. Since the
statute itself equates a refusal with guilt (by revoking the driver's
license) and expresses a strong policy to protect the public from the
threat of drunken driving, there appears no compelling reason to
forbid comment on a person's refusal to take a blood test.51
Justice Jasen hit the nail on the head. In general, legislatures rec-
ognized that people under the influence of alcohol tend to be more abu-
sive, obtrusive and combative than they would be if sober. To require
law enforcement officials to withdraw blood or make an accused take a
breath test could easily lead to a pitched battle between police and the
accused. Injuries to either or both could easily occur; hence the neces-
sity for permitting the defendant not to take the test. Others have
reached the same conclusion:
[I]f it be admitted that the privilege of refusal stems from a legis-
lative effort to eliminate unreasonable force in terms of police ac-
tion, the accused has received all benefits due him when he is
granted merely the right [sic] of refusal. For the sake of peace and
order the State has surrendered evidence of significant value and
beneficence at the sacrifice of effective law enforcement should not
be compounded by denying the state the privilege of comment. 52
This explanation for not forcing a defendant to take a blood alco-
S.C. 213, 185 S.E.2d 359 (1971); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d
614 (1954); State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958); City of Westerville v.
Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 129, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345,
211 So. 2d 285 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Rutan, 229 Pa. Super. 400, 323
A.2d 730 (1974). Pennsylvania subsequently amended its implied consent statute to
prohibit admission of such evidence. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(c) (Purdon
1977). See Commonwealth v. Charles, 270 Pa. Super. 280, 411 A.2d 527 (1979).
51. 29 N.Y.2d 504, 506, 272 N.E.2d 486, 487, 323 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1971).
52. Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal Problems,
44 MINN. L. REV. 673, 705 (1960).
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hol test was adopted in Hill v. State:
Therefore, it seems that the act does not contemplate a per se right
of refusal, rather this acquiescence in refusal is in the posture of
avoiding potential violent conflicts. . . . See Campbell v. Superior
Court. . . 'this language does not give a person a 'right' to refuse
to submit to the test only the physical power [to].' 53
By informing the defendant his license will be suspended, but not
specifying in the statute that a refusal to take the test could be used
against him, legislatures may have intended to prohibit as evidence a
defendant's refusal to take the test.
A small minority of non-Florida courts have held a defendant's
refusal inadmissible, even though the state statute does not specifically
grant a defendant the "right" to refuse.54 These courts reasoned that
when the state legislature imposed a mandatory license suspension that
was the only penalty intended. Legislative silence on the issue of admis-
sibility indicated that refusal would not be admissible. This view was
expressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Puller v. Municipality of
Anchorage:
An intrinsic aid to statutory construction is found in the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The maxim establishes the in-
ference that, where certain things are designated in a statute, 'all
omissions should be understood as exclusions.' The maxim is one of
long-standing application, and it is essentially an application of
common sense and logic.
With respect to AS 28.35.032, we find that the enumeration of cer-
53. 366 So. 2d 318, 323 (Ala. 1979).
54. a) Puller v. Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Alaska 1978). ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.032 (1978): "If a person under arrest refuses the request of a law enforcement
officer to submit to a chemical test of his breath. . . after being advised by the officer
that the refusal will result in the suspension, denial or revocation of his license, a chem-
ical test shall not be given." b) City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976). Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.050 (1979): "If a person under arrest refuses
upon the request of the arresting officer to submit to a chemical test, which request
... shall inform the person that his license may be revoked upon his refusal to take
the test, then none shall be given." c) Kansas v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, 613 P.2d
384 (1976). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001(c) (Supp. 1980): "If the person so arrested
refuses a request to submit to a test of breath or blood, none shall be given."
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tain sanctions, suspension or revocation of license, and the require-
ment that those sanctions be included in a warning preclude the
imposition of additional consequences. The admissibility of evi-
dence of the fact of refusal would constitute such an additional
consequence. 55
These courts have interpreted their statutes to mean that a defen-
dant has a real choice to refuse and is not merely revoking his previ-
ously granted implied consent to the test. In City of St. Joseph v. John-
son the court commented:
Acceptance by a motorist of a license to operate a vehicle upon the
highways of this state does not amount to an implied consent to
submit himself to chemical analysis when charged with driving in
an intoxicated condition. The sobriquet 'implied consent law' both
misnominates § 566.444 and also misleads as to its legal effects.5"
Of course, whether a legislature intended its silence to prohibit a
defendant's refusal to be admissible is a matter of interpretation for
each state. One could just as easily argue that by never specifically
stating a defendant's refusal is "not admissible" the legislature in-
tended that it be admissible.
Comparison of Florida Statute to Other State Statutes
Florida's Implied Consent Statute does not give a defendant the
"right" to refuse to take a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol
level. Florida's statute has virtually the same language as statutes in
those states which have ruled that a defendant has no statutory "right"
to refuse the breath test. There is no substantial difference between
Florida's Implied Consent Statute and New Jersey's 39:4-50.2(a),
which State v. Tabisz57 held did not grant the defendant a statutory
right to refuse.
55. 574 P.2d at 1288.
56. 539 S.W.2d at 786.
57. 129 N.J. Super. 810, 322 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). But see
Kansas v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, 132 n.17, 613 P.2d 384, 385-86 n.17, citing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001(a) (Supp. 1980). The Wilson court was an appellate court
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Refusing Blood Alcohol Test
FLA. STAT. § 322.261 Suspension of
license; chemical test for
intoxication.
(1)(a) Any person who shall accept
the privilege extended by the laws of
this state of operating a motor
vehicle within this state shall by so
operating such vehicle be deemed to
have given his consent to submit to
an approved chemical test of his
breath for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of
his blood if he is lawfully arrested
for any offense allegedly committed
while the person was driving a
motor vehicle under the influence of
alcoholic beverages. The test shall
be incidental to a lawful arrest and
administered at the request of a
peace officer having reasonable
cause to believe such person was
driving a motor vehicle within this
state while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages. Such person
shall be told that his failure to
submit to such a chemical test will
result in the suspension of his
privilege to operate a motor vehicle
for a period of three months.
N.J. STAT. § 39:4-50.2(a):
Any person who operates a
motor vehicle on any public
road, street or highway or quasi-
public area in this State shall be
deemed to have given his
consent to the taking of samples
of his breath for the purpose of
making chemical tests to
determine the content of alcohol
in his blood. ....
When the implied consent statute is read in its entirety, it is clear
the legislature never intended to give a suspected DUI defendant the
"right" to refuse the test. In enacting Florida Statute Section 322.262,
the Florida legislature specifically gave an individual a "statutory
right" to refuse a pre-arrest breath test to determine the percentage of
alcohol in his blood. "Prior to administering any pre-arrest breath test,
a law enforcement officer shall advise the motor vehicle operator that
542 P.2d 720 (1975). Ironically, this same situation exists in Florida with State v.
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he has the right to refuse to take such test, and, prior to administering
such test, a law enforcement officer shall obtain the written consent of
the motor vehicle operator." 58
Significantly, no such "right" is given a defendant after he has
been arrested for DUI pursuant to Florida Statute Section 322.261(a).
[W]here language is used in one section of a statute different from
that used in other sections of the same Chapter, it is presumed that
the language is used with different intent. Accordingly, the pres-
ence of a provision in one portion of a statute and its absence from
another are an argument against reading it as implied by the sec-
tion from which it is omitted. 59
The Florida legislature has specifically mandated that a pre-arrest
breath test is not admissible evidence. "The results of any [pre-arrest]
test administered under this section shall not be admissible into evi-
dence in any civil or criminal proceeding." 60 Since the Florida legisla-
ture specifically excluded as evidence a pre-arrest test, by its silence it
appears the legislature intended that a post-arrest test should be
admissible.
It is also necessary to look at the overall purpose of Florida Stat-
ute 322.261 in conjunction with Florida's DUI Statute."' The supreme
court asserted this in Bender v. State: "The overall purpose of this
chapter [322] is to address the problem of drunk drivers on our public
roadways and to assist in implementing Section 316.193 which provides
that driving while intoxicated is unlawful. 62 Thus, when viewing the
legislative purpose as a whole, it does not appear theFlorida legislature
ever intended to prohibit as evidence a defendant's refusal. The Wis-
consin court commenting on legislative silence concerning a defendant's
refusal to take the test stated in State v. Albright:
'[T]he clear policy of the [implied consent] statute is to facilitate
the identification of drunken drivers and their removal from the
highways [and] the statute must be construed to further the legis-
58. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis added).
59. 30 FLA. JUR. Statutes § 96 (1974).
60. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(b)(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
61. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (1979).
62. 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980).
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lative purpose.' Evidence of refusal is relevant and constitutionally
admissible. We do not interpret the silence of a legislature which
maintained a strong desire to remove drunk drivers from Wisconsin
roads to mean that this relevant evidence is inadmissible in a pro-
ceeding for driving while intoxicated.63
In Florida, unless specifically excluded by the legislature, "all rele-
vant evidence is admissible except as provided by law."'64 Thus, if the
refusal to take the test is relevant, the Florida legislature could have
prohibited admitting this evidence by explicitly saying So. 6 5 Its silence
could easily be interpreted to mean the evidence is admissible.
Florida case law has constantly interpreted the Florida Implied
Consent Statute to require a defendant to take the test unless he re-
vokes his previous consent. 6 Thus, the theory used by Missouri in City
of St. Joseph v. Johnson,67 which indicated that a driver does not agree
in advance to take the test, would not apply in Florida. Seemingly,
Florida courts should adopt the rationale used in People v. Thomas:
"The admissibility of refusal evidence may also be viewed as a permis-
sible condition reasonably attached to the grant of permission to oper-
ate a motor vehicle on the highways of the state."6
During the 1981 legislative session, a bill69 was introduced which
would have substantially amended Florida Statute Section 322.261.
One of the many revisions of this bill contained statutory language spe-
cifically permitting as evidence a defendant's refusal to take a blood
alcohol test. The bill passed the House, but was never voted on by the
Senate. Since the bill contained numerous revisions and was never ac-
tually rejected by the Senate, the failure to pass this bill sheds no new
light on legislative intent regarding the admissibility of the refusal to
63. 98 Wis. 2d at 672-73, 298 N.W.2d at 201, quoting State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis.
2d 191, 193, 289 N.W.2d 828, 830 (1980).
64. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1979).
65. See note 44 supra for statutes so worded.
66. Sambrine v. State, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980); State v. Smith, 278 So. 2d
281 (Fla. 1976); State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
"[T]hus it appears that the implied consent in this state may be revoked at the time the
chemical test is suggested by an officer." Id. at 1210.
67. 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). See note 54 supra.
68. 46 N.Y.2d at 110, 385 N.E.2d at 589, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
69. FLA. H.B. 1117 (1981).
!
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take a blood alcohol test.
Florida Decisions on the "Right" to Refuse a Blood Alcohol
Test
Three Florida appellate decisions, State v. Duke, State v. Sam-
brine and State v. Ducksworth, have now dealt with the legal issue of
whether Florida Statute 322.261 gives a defendant the "right" to re-
fuse a blood alcohol test.7 0 None of the courts discussed foreign cases in
their written opinions.
Duke adopted the theory that a defendant may have the physical
power to refuse the blood alcohol test, but not the "right" to do so. In
addition, Duke felt that it would be better public policy not to reward
those who refuse to take the test:
A driver retains the physical power to refuse a sobriety test, but
not the legal right to withdraw his implied consent.
Public policy considerations favor the physical power/legal right
distinction. If Section 322.261(1)(a) is concluded not to be compul-
sory, the driver who refuses the test is penalized only by the sus-
pension of his license for 3 months. However, the driver who takes
the test faces a greater penalty as the results could be evidence
against him at trial. This non-compulsory interpretation would lead
to drivers not taking the test.71
The Duke court went on to hold that a defendant's refusal to take the
test is generally admissible.
In Sambrine the Florida Supreme Court never ruled on the issue
of whether a defendant's refusal is admissible evidence. The issue in
Sambrine was whether a sample of blood taken over the defendant's
objection was admissible evidence. The court held that the legislature
intended to exclude such evidence: "The legislature may have con-
cluded that it was preferable to enforce the implied consent law
through this method [license suspension] than mandate that law en-
forcement officials be required to physically restrain every individual
70. State v. Duke, 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Sam-
brine, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980); State v. Ducksworth, 408 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) reh. denied Jan. 25, 1982.
71. 378 So. 2d at 98.
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who refused to submit to the test."'7 2 This author's research of other
states' implied consent statutes indicates that such a conclusion was
correct. Unfortunately, the Sambrine court muddied this entire area of
law by stating:
The Court is not free to ignore such plain language and obvious
legislative intent. Any careful reading of Section 322.261 leads to
the inescapable conclusion that a person is given the right to refuse
testing. If this were not so, it is unclear why the legislature pro-
vided for a definite sanction and a detailed procedure for the en-
forcement of such sanction.7 3
The court's use of the word "right" is troubling for a number of
reasons. First, the court's analysis of the legislature's "obvious" intent
was less than thorough, for it did not consider the legislative intent
evidenced in the different statutory language for pre- and post-arrest
tests. 4
Second, the court never bothered to cite, much less distinguish or
overrule, Duke. Had it done so, it might have seen the difference be-
tween saying a defendant can not be physically forced to take a blood
test and saying he has a "right" not to do so.
Third, the court never analyzed decisions from other jurisdictions
with statutes which did not use the term "right" (and which generally
permit admission of a defendant's refusal) and those states with stat-
utes which used the term "right" (and generally exclude admission of
such a refusal).
What is even more perplexing is that the "right" language was not
essential to the court's decision, hence dicta. Although not binding,
since it emanated from the Florida Supreme Court such language is
considered highly persuasive. 5
In State v. Ducksworth7 6 the Second District Court of Appeal, be-
cause of Sambrine, retreated from Duke. In a terse two paragraph
opinion, it ruled a defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test inad-
72. 386 So. 2d at 549.
73. Id. at 548.
74. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
75. Milligan v. State, 177 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
76. 408 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) reh. denied Jan. 25, 1982.
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missible. It upheld a trial court decision that admired the Duke analy-
sis but felt bound by Sambrine.7 Whether the Second District Court
thought Sambrine's use of the term "right" was binding or dicta was
not discussed.
Thus, if the dicta in Sambrine is taken at face value, a defendant
has a right to refuse to take the test. With such a right a defendant's
refusal would be inadmissible since it would violate fundamental fair-
ness by penalizing a defendant for exercising his right.78
However, if the term "right" as used by Justice Atkins is a misno-
mer, then the better reasoning would be to admit the refusal. The pur-
pose of the implied consent statute is to prevent violence by not physi-
cally forcing a defendant to take the test; it is not to give the accused a
better chance to avoid conviction of DU. Further, public policy dic-
tates that a defendant not be "rewarded" for refusing to take the test:
to do so would simply nullify the legislative intent.
Prejudicial Effects Outweighing Probative Value
Decisions in Other Jurisdictions
Courts which have ruled there is no constitutional nor statutory
"right" to refuse the test have uniformly ruled that a refusal has suffi-
cient probative value to be admissible.7" These courts have ruled that a
refusal indicates a consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant.
It infers that the defendant knew if he took the test, he would fail.
This was expressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Westerville v.
Cunningham:
Where a defendant is being accused of intoxication and is not in-
toxicated, the taking of a reasonably reliable chemical test for in-
toxication should establish that he is not intoxicated. On the other
hand, if he is intoxicated, the taking of such a test will probably
establish that he is intoxicated. Thus, if he is not intoxicated, such
77. Ducksworth v. State, # 80-3029-AP-01 at 2 (Fla. 12th Cir. filed Mar. 2,
1981).
78. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
79. See notes 33 and 50 supra. Conversely, those courts which held that a defen-
dant has either a statutory or constitutional right to refuse have ruled that the results
of such tests have no probative value. See text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
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a test will provide evidence for him; but, if he is intoxicated, the
test will provide evidence against him. Thus, it is reasonable to in-
fer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear
of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt, especially
where he is asked his reason for such refusal and he gives no reason
which would indicate that his refusal had no relation to such con-
sciousness of guilt.80
These courts have also ruled that no undue prejudice is borne by
the defendants. As Justice Traynor explained in People v. Ellis:
Evidence of the refusal is not only probative; its admission op-
erates to induce suspects to cooperate with law enforcement offi-
cials. Only the overriding interest in protecting the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, itself the result of a delicate
balance, prohibits evidence or comment in the refusal to testify
cases. But the privilege itself is not at issue here. Without excep-
tion, none of the reasons that support the privilege lends support to
a rule that would exclude probative evidence obtained from an ac-
cused's effort to conceal nonprivileged evidence.81
Some courts have argued that a defendant is never required to co-
operate with the police, but Justice Traynor rejected this argument:
It has been urged that the privilege reflects an ultimate sense
of fairness that prohibits the state from demanding assistance of
any kind from an individual in penal proceedings taken against
him. . . . Criminal proceedings are replete with instances where at
least passive cooperation of an accused may be constitutionally
required.82
Most courts holding that a defendant's refusal does not have suffi-
cient prolative value have based their decisions on the defendant's stat-
utory or constitutional "right" not to take the test.83 This was ex-
80. 15 Ohio St. 2d 129, 130, 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1968).
81. 65 Cal. 2d at 538, 421 P.2d at 398, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
82. Id. at 534, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
83. Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1957). See also Engler v. State,
316 P.2d 625 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1957); Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188
S.E.2d 416 (1972); City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539"S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App.
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pressed by the Missouri court in St. Joseph's:
The admissibility of the refusal as evidence of intoxication in a col-
lateral criminal proceeding, therefore, depends upon whether the
probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Our decisions recognize that a motorist must make his choice to
refuse or submit in the atmosphere of his arrest and restraint ...
In this environment, the refusal may result equally from rational
causes of disquiet as from a consciousness of guilt.84
One state, Oklahoma, went so far as to say that a defendant's re-
fusal is of no evidentiary value. In Duckworth v. State, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court said:
The defendant [would be] the victim of prejudice created by no
real fact produced by the test, but by surmise, speculation and in-
nuendo based only on the assertion by the defendant of his funda-
mental right to refuse the test. In no other way can the right to
refuse have any meaning or constitute more than a mere shadow of
substance.85
It must be remembered that this decision came prior to Schmerber and
at a time when the reliability of such tests were seriously in question.88
One court, in State v. Annonymous, ruled that such evidence was
incompetent:
Implicit in such testimony of refusal is the irremediable suggestion
that had the test been given, the results would have been as nearly
infallible on the issue of intoxication, providing either guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, as scientific ingenuity could devise, and, thus,
from a mere refusal to submit to such test, fairly and reasonably,
could be derived an inference of guilt. With this basic assumption
we do not agree. The evidence objected to was incompetent for the
1976); Kansas v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, 613 P.2d 384 (1976); Washington v.
Parker, 16 Wash. App. 632, 558 P.2d 1361 (1976); Crawly v. State, 219 Tenn. 707,
413 S.W.2d 370 (1967); People v. Hayes, 64 Mich. App. 203, 235 N.W.2d 182 (1975).
84. 539 S.W.2d at 787.
85. 309 P.2d at 1105.
86. The theory in Duckworth was severely criticized at Note, Effect of Comment
on Refusal to Submit to Intoximeter Test, 10 OKLA. L. REV. 331 (1957).
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purpose for which it was offered and should have been excluded.87
But the Connecticut court failed to state why it was incompetent. Jus-
tice Traynor relied upon Professor Wigmore in Ellis:
The inferential chain here is no different from that which
makes any event that does not directly illuminate the circum-
stances of the crime charged a relevant fact. The trier of fact must
reason from, for example, an escape from jail, to a consciousness of
guilt that would motivate the escapee's conduct, and, from that
premise, to the conclusion that such conduct is relevant to the ulti-
mate issue of guilt or innocence.88
Florida Decisions
No appellate Florida court has yet ruled directly on the prejudicial
aspect of admitting the refusal to take an alcohol test. It is, therefore,
important to look at how Florida courts have ruled in analogous
situations.
In Young v. State the Florida Supreme Court held certain photo-
graphs inadmissible because of their inflammatory nature:
Where there is an element of relevancy to support admissibility
then the trial judge in the first instant and this Court on appeal
must determine whether the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the
jury and detract them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration
of the evidence.89
Florida appellate courts have ruled that a defendant's refusal to
take a "required" test is of sufficient probative value to be admissible.90
In makirig these decisions the courts necessarily have ruled that the
evidence had sufficient probative value to outweigh any prejudicial ef-
87. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 470, , 276 A.2d 452, 455 (1971).
88. 65 Cal. 2d at 538 n.12, 421 P.2d at 398 n.12, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.12.
89. 234 So. 2d 341, 348 (Fla. 1970) quoting Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 324,
331-32 (Fla. 1961).
90. State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (nitrate test);
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1980) (voice identification).
2331Refusing Blood Alcohol Test
25
Hauser: Admissibility of Refusal to Submit to Blood Alcohol Test
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Nova Law Journal
fects. In describing why the possession of recently stolen property by
the defendant had probative value, the Florida Supreme Court stated
in State v. Young-
Moreover, the inference of guilt that the jury may infer from
the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods does not arise
from the possessor's failure to explain or demonstrate by evidence
of exculpatory facts and circumstances that his possession of the
recently stolen goods is innocent. It is the fact of possession that
provides the basis for the inference of guilt. This inference is
founded on '. .. the manifest reason that when goods have been
taken from one person, and are quickly thereafter found in the pos-
session of another, there is a strong possibility that they were taken
by the latter.'91
The court went on to explain the probative value of such evidence:
It can be seen, therefore, that the rule of evidence respecting pos-
session of recently stolen goods is no different, in kind, from the
rule respecting the probative value of any other circumstantial evi-
dence. Flight, concealment, resistance to a lawful arrest, presence
at the scene of the crime, incriminating fingerprints - the whole
body of circumstantial evidence relevant in a given case - are all
incriminating circumstances which the jury may consider as tend-
ing to show guilt if evidence thereof is allowed to go to the jury
unexplained or unrebutted by evidence of exculpatory facts and
circumstances. 92
Florida has a low threshold for admitting evidence of probative
value. In most states, a court must balance whether the probative value
of evidence outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant. In Flor-
ida, the proof necessary to admit such evidence is much lower; a defen-
dant's refusal will be admitted unless its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value.93
Thus, in determining whether a defendant's refusal to take the test
has sufficient probative value, courts will look to whether the defendant
91. 217 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1968) cert. denied 396 U.S. 853 (1969).
92. Id. at 571.
93. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1979).
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has a statutory or constitutional "right" to refuse. As stated previously,
there is confusion at the appellate level in Florida whether a defendant
has such a statutory "right" to refuse.94 If there is no "right" the evi-
dence will have sufficient probative value; if there is a "right" the evi-
dence would probably be considered too prejudicial.
Violation of Fundamental Due Process
Florida Statute Section 321.261(1)(e) requires a defendant be told
that if he refuses to take the test his license will be suspended for three
months; he need not be told that his refusal might be used against him
at trial. It would, therefore, be possible for a defendant to be misled
into believing that the only consequence of his refusal would be the
suspension of his license.
Decisions in Other Jurisdictions
In Washington v. Parker9 5 the Washington Supreme Court rea-
soned that a defendant would have to be told that his refusal could be
used against him.
In other words, had the statute intended evidentiary use of the
right of refusal, it is logical that the arresting officer would be re-
quired to inform [defendant] that his refusal could be used as evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding as well as the consequential loss of
the privilege to drive. Since the statute does not require such warn-
ing, we conclude that the legislation did not contemplate the addi-
tional consequence."
In Puller v. City of Anchorage the Alaska Supreme Court adopted
a similar rational: "We view the warning requirement as a protective
device to assure an informed choice on the part of the motorist. It
would be unfair to have the driver believe that refusal would have one
consequence and then permit the state to assert an additional
94. For discussion, see notes 50-77 supra.
95. 558 P.2d 1361 (Wash. 1976).
96. Id. at 1363. Washington specifically gives the defendant the statutory "right"
to refuse the test.
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consequence. '9 7
Whether the police are required under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment to give such a warning is an open question. In
answering this question one must first determine what due process re-
quires. The United States Supreme Court set forth a three prong test
in Mathews v. Eldridge:9 8
1. The private interest at stake.
2. The government interest at stake.
3. The risk that procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.
Applying the first prong, a defendant has a substantial interest in
being warned that his refusal could be used against him at trial. His
refusal might have been based solely on his willingness to accept a
three month suspension for not taking the test; had he known the re-
fusal could be used at trial he might have taken the test. Applying the
second prong, the "cost" to government is minimal; in fact, the only
possible cost might be the exclusion of such evidence where the police
fail to warn the defendant. Finally, applying the third prong, there is a
risk that a defendant might refuse under the mistaken impression the
refusal could not be used at trial. The number of individuals who will
be misled is probably minimal. But common sense teaches us that it
would be better to avoid constitutional problems by requiring such a
warning.
In dealing solely with the issue of whether the police must give the
defendant a warning, the comparison of a defendant's refusal to give a
voice or handwriting exemplar with refusal to give a blood alcohol test
is inappropriate. In the former cases, the defendant is told to take the
test, but he is told nothing else. There is no need to tell him his refusal
could be used against him; there is no possibility he could be misled. In
the latter case, the defendant is told his license will be suspended for
three months if he does not take the test. Without being informed that
his refusal could be used against him at trial, the defendant could be
misled.
Florida Decisions
No Florida court has directly addressed the degree of warning the
97. 574 P.2d at 1288.
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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state must give the defendant before he takes the breathalyzer test.99
Recently the Florida Supreme Court in Miller v. State100 resolved a
conflict between the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal 01 as
to the type of warning necessary in vehicle impoundment cases. Miller
was arrested for not having a valid driver's license. The police im-
pounded his car since there was no one else to drive it away. The defen-
dant was never warned by the police that he could prevent impound-
ment by telephoning a friend to drive the vehicle away. The court
required the warning: "[A]n officer, when arresting a present owner or
possessor of a motor vehicle, must advise him or her that the vehicle
will be impounded unless the owner or possessor can provide a reason-
able alternative to impoundment. '10 2
When there is the possibility that a defendant was overtly misled
as to whether he was required to take the blood alcohol test, Florida
courts have held a defendant's refusal inadmissible. In Gay v. Orlando,
the Florida Fourth District Court stated: "Petitioner was told he had a
right not to take the breath analysis test. He chose not to and this fact
was brought out at triai. ' ' 103 Gay held the evidence was suppressable.
Commenting on Gay, the Second District Court in State v. Esperti
said:
In that case the defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test; but
it is patent therein that such refusal did not occur until after the
officer told the defendant that he need not take the test. Evidence
of such refusal was said to be inadmissible, as it should have been,
since if for no other reason, it was violative of due process and fair
99. In State v. Duke, 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) the court
discussed warnings but did not address the issue of warning a defendant that his re-
fusal to take an alcohol test could be used against him.
100. 403 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1981).
101. The Second District Court of Appeal held that police need not inform de-
fendants whose vehicles were being impounded that if they could locate a friend to
drive the vehicle away there would be no impoundment. State v. Sanders, 387 So. 2d
391 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Dearden, 347 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that police must give such warn-
ings. Session v. State, 353 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Jones v. State,
345 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
102. 403 So. 2d at 1314 (emphasis added).
103. 202 So. 2d at 898 (emphasis added).
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In State v. Duke the arresting officer told the defendant "I am
now offering to give an approved chemical test of your breath for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of your blood. If you re-
fuse to take this test your privilege of operating a motor vehicle will be
suspended for a period of 3 months .... 11o5 The Second District
Court concluded that the defendant could have believed that he had a
choice. Therefore, his refusal could not be admitted. "The defendant
should have been told that the officer was prepared to give an approved
chemical test; that the driver did not have a right to refuse, but if he
did refuse, his license would be revoked for a period of 3 months."1 06
The police of Orange County, Florida, have adopted the warning
suggested in Duke:
You are required by the applicable provision of Chapter 322 of
The Florida Statutes to submit to a breathalyzer test and your fail-
ure to submit to the same will result in the suspension of your driv-
ing privileges for a period of three months. This breathalyzer test is
being given to you as a result of your being charged with the of-
fense of driving while under the influence and is not being given to
you as a continuation of the accident investigation or accident re-
port in this case. Further, the results of this breathalyzer test may
be used against you as evidence in any subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding for the offense of driving while under the influence.107
Other Factors
A defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test or have blood
withdrawn may be based on arguably valid grounds. A defendant
might not want blood withdrawn for religious reasons or out of a genu-
ine fear of needles. The defendant might not trust the test or testing
104. 220 So. 2d at 419 (emphasis added).
105. 378 So. 2d at 98 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Orange County, Florida, Sheriff's Department Form "Alcohol Influence Re-
port Interviewer's Dialogue" (emphasis added). In December of 1981 the form was
amended to include the words "[t]he result of this. . . test or your refusal to submit to
this test may be used against you as evidence .. .
1238 6:1982 1
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procedures. If that were in fact proven, one court, Michigan v.Hayes, 10 would suppress the results. Of course, the refusal might also
be because he was so intoxicated that he was unable to make the
"choice." In that case admission of the refusal should be permitted.
Other constitutional rights of the defendant might have been vio-
lated, which would warrant suppression. Suppose, before deciding
whether to take the test, the defendant asked to talk to an attorney. If
the police prevented him from doing so he would be denied his Fifth
Amendment right to consult with an attorney. 10° The violation of this
right would require the evidence be suppressed.
Of course, whether a defendant's refusal is or is not admissible
must be decided on a case by case basis. The Alabama Supreme Court
in Hill v. Staten ° ruled that deciding the reason a defendant refused is
ultimately an issue for the jury. This, of course, might require the de-
fendant to take the stand. However, pursuant to Florida Statute
90.612(2), the trial court would have the authority to limit any cross-
examination by the state to the question of why the defendant refused
the test.
Thus, for the sake of due process and fair play, a defendant should
be told prior to the test that in addition to having his license suspended,
his refusal could be used against him. If a defendant refuses for some
other reason, whether his refusal is admissible must be decided on a
case by case basis. The burden for proving a valid reason for refusing is
on the defendant.
Conclusion
A defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test should be admis-
sible evidence in Florida courts. Its admission would neither violate the
defendant's right not to incriminate himself nor impinge on his right to
remain silent. A proper reading of Florida's Implied Consent Statute
indicates that a defendant has no statutory "right" to refuse the test;
thus admission would not violate a defendant's fundamental due pro-
108. 64 Mich. App. 203, 235 N.W. 2d 182 (1975).
109. In State v. Roche, 50 Fla. Supp. 127 (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct. 1980), if prior
to deciding whether to take the test, the police denied the defendant's request to talk to
an attorney, the defendant was deemed not to have refused to take the test.
110. 366 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 1978).
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cess rights; but this issue has been confused by the dicta of Justice
Atkins in Sambrine v. State. A defendant's refusal has sufficient proba-
tive value to be admissible in Florida courts.
Unless a defendant is somehow misled, and this will be substan-
tially avoided if a defendant is told that his refusal could be used
against him at trial, there is no reason why the defendant's refusal
should not be admitted.""1
111. While this article was being printed, the Florida Legislature declared its
position on the admissibility of refusal to take the alcohol test. "Refusal to submit to a
chemical breath or urine test upon request of a law enforcement officer . . . shall be
admissible into evidence in any criminal proceedings." FLA. C.S.-C.S.-C.S.-S.B. 69,
432, 312, 351, 39, 285 (1982), passed by the legislature awaiting the governor's signa-
ture, to be effective July 1, 1982, as FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a). Blood test refusal
will be admissible under subsection (1)(c) of the statute.
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